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Blanco v. Burton: Louisiana's Struggle for
Cooperative Federalism in Offshore Energy
Development
I. INTRODUCTION: HURRICANE KATRINA EXPOSES LOUISIANA'S
FRAGILE COASTLINE

The day after Hurricane Katrina struck the coast of Louisiana,
biologist Tommy Michot and geographer Chris Wells of the
United States Geological Survey conducted a flight to photograph
and assess the damage to Louisiana's coastland.' Michot and Wells
took aerial photographs of countless destroyed human structures,
including almost all of the homes and camps on Grand Isle. The
town of Venice, located just west of the Delta National Wildlife
Refuge, was completely flooded, leavin3g lumber and dead
vegetation washed up against the levee. The most dramatic
impacts of Katrina were seen along the Chandeleur Islands, which
served as an important habitat for wildlife and were the first line of
of those
hurricane defense for Louisiana's coastline. The land mass
4
islands had been reduced by an astonishing fifty percent.
Scientists with the U.S. Geological Survey believe about 100
square miles of marshland were destroyed and became open water
as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 5 Since the early 1990s,
the state has spent roughly a half billion dollars building rock
barriers, planting marsh grasses, and diverting freshwater into lowwater. Katrina and Rita erased all of
lying areas damaged by salt
6
that progress in an instant.
Traditionally, the populace was averse to "environmental
extremists." '7 In fact, Governor Blanco was the self-proclaimed "oil

Copyright 2008, by PATRICK B. SANDERS.
1. National Wetlands Research Center, U.S. Geological Survey: National
Wetlands Research Center, Hurricane Katrina Photographs August 30, 2005,
http ://www.nwrc.usgs.gov/hurricane/post-hurricane-katrina-photos.htm.
2. Grand Isle is a barrier island located at the mouth of Barataria Bay
where it meets the Gulf of Mexico.
3. National Wetlands Research Center, supra note 1.

4. Id.

5. Cain Burdeau, HurricanesTake Bite Out of La. Wetlands, WASH. POST,
Nov. 10, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/
11/10/AR2005111000138_pf.html. Hurricane Rita made landfall on Louisiana's
western coast on September 24, 2005.

6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Frank Ashby, Jr., A Friend of the Environment, TIMES
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 25, 1991, at B1O.
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and gas governor."8 However, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
significantly shifted the paradigm of Louisiana politics. Katrina
particularly demonstrated to the citizens of Louisiana just how
dangerous the loss of a coastal buffer can be. Suddenly, protecting
the environment was a central part of the conversation and an
important factor in the region's long-term survival.
Thus, in light of Katrina's destruction, it was not surprising that
Governor Blanco sued the United States Department of the Interior
in Blanco v. Burton for their failure to cooperate with Louisiana in
protecting its coastline in the months that followed. 9 The Blanco
lawsuit was precipitated by the federal government's decision to
proceed with an oil and gas lease sale in the Gulf of Mexico
within weeks of the two devastating hurricanes. The Department of
the Interior dismissed Louisiana's environmental concerns
associated with the lease sale, illustrating the friction between
federal and state governments in balancing offshore energy
development with environmental regulations.
The erosion of Louisiana's coastline and wetlands is a multifaceted problem. The causes of erosion include, but are not limited
to, the destruction from hurricanes, a levee system that interrupts
the natural flooding process, wave erosion, and the natural sinking
of marshland. Another significant factor having an impact on the
State's coastline and wetlands is the expanding oil and gas
industry. While the State has reaped economic benefit from
offshore oil and gas production, it has also incurred tremendous
infrastructure and environmental costs to make offshore production
possible. Scott Angelle, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of
Natural Resources, testified before Congress in June of 2006 that
Louisiana has
tens of billions of dollars of requirements to repair, rebuild,
and maintain the infrastructure needs of roads, ports, flood
protection, environmental damage from old practices of the
8. Stephanie Grace, Editorial, An 'Oil and Gas Governor' Draws the Line,
TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 11, 2006, at B7.
9. Blanco v. Burton, No. Civ.A. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *1 (E.D.
La. Aug. 14, 2006).
10. A "lease sale" is an auction system whereby the Department of the
Interior puts specified areas up for lease in federally controlled waters. The
Mineral Management Service gives a notice of leasing with an identification of
tracts and the potential lessees can evaluate what they think the lease is worth.
Oil and gas companies bid on the tracts, seeking to obtain a right to drill in that
desired tract. Leasing the tract also involves the right of shared royalties of any
discovered oil and gas in that tract. The royalty is based on a percentage
determined by federal law. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a)(3)-(4), 1337(a)(1), 1344
(2000).
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past, onshore disposal of offshore production wastes, and
other infrastructure, including restoring protective coastal
wetlands that are being lost at a rate of more than 24 square
miles per year.ll
Approximately 200 acres of wetlands are lost per year due to
human activities associated with the oil and gas industry.' 2 Inland
and coastal dredging, the building of channels for navigation, oil
the
and gas exploration, land reclamation projects, as well 1as
loss. 3
this
to
factors
contributing
all
are
ports,
of
construction
Some of the contributing factors of coastal erosion are not
easily manageable by legislation or through the court system.
Mother Nature controls the hurricane season, and a dramatic
overhaul of the present levee system in the state is not financially
feasible. However, one area where legislation can and has made a
difference is offshore energy development. A balance is needed for
Louisiana to continue to provide for the nation's energy needs
while protecting its coastal environment. This balance can only be
achieved through true cooperation between the federal and state
agencies involved in oil and gas production.
Part II of this Note provides a historical context for a proper
understanding of Blanco v. Burton. There has been an ongoing
dispute between the federal government and coastal states over
who has control of oil and gas production in the offshore area. This
conflict concerns who will control drilling rights, who will benefit
from them, and who will receive oil and gas royalties to finance
environmental protections. Part III presents the facts and
arguments of the case, including the findings of the court that the
Department of the Interior failed to cooperate with Louisiana in the
lease sale process and had disregarded environmental regulations.
Part IV offers solutions for this multi-faceted environmental crisis
by stressing the importance of cooperative federalism 14 between
federal and state governments. The judiciary is encouraged to
11. Hearing on Domestic Energy Production through Offshore Exploration
and Equitable Treatment of State Holdings Act of 2006, 109th Cong. 1 (2006)
(statement of Scott A. Angelle, Sec'y of the La. Dept. of Natural Res.),
available at http://dnr.louisiana.gov/sec/execdiv/pubinfo/newsr/2O06/0614secangelle-testimony.pdf [hereinafter Angelle].
12. Donald F. Boesch et al., Scientific Assessment of Coastal Wetlands
Loss, Restoration and Management in Louisiana, 20 J. COASTAL RES. (SPECIAL
ISSUE) 61 (1994).
13. Id.
14. Cooperative federalism is the "[d]istribution of power between the
federal government and the states in which each recognizes the powers of the
other while jointly engaging in certain governmental functions." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 644 (8th ed. 2004).
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make a more effective use of the preliminary injunction to
postpone lease sales once it is determined an agency has failed to
follow environmental regulations. Finally, Congress is encouraged
to enact further legislation requiring a sharing of offshore royalties
with coastal states to finance environmental projects.
II. LOUISIANA AND THE TIDELANDS CONTROVERSY: A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE

The conflict between the federal government and coastal state
governments over offshore energy development is often referred to
as the Tidelands Oil Controversy. The friction occurs because
both the federal government and the coastal states have a vested
interest in offshore energy development. The federal interest
includes an ever-increasing demand for a domestic supply of
energy, preserving jobs in the oil industry, generating federal
revenues, and reducing the trade deficit.' Likewise, offshore
energy development provides economic benefits to the coastal
states, although they bear the brunt of 7adverse environmental
impacts associated with such development.'
The Tidelands Oil Controversy particularly involves the states'
share of money from federally controlled offshore oil and gas
royalties. If Louisiana (or any coastal state, for that matter) is to
finance a meaningful environmental program to protect its
coastlines, it must share the revenues generated by offshore drilling
and production.' 8 These royalties are the appropriate source of
funds for addressing environmental needs since offshore oil and
gas production and its related activities have significantly
contributed to the destruction of the State's coastline. Because
Louisiana's offshore drilling and production have provided oil and
gas for the rest of the nation and billions of dollars to the federal
treasury, the federal government has an obligation to mitigate the
environmental impact to the state resulting from offshore energy
development.
The United States Supreme Court confronted several related
issues connected with the Tidelands Oil Controversy from the
1940s through the 1960s. The holdings from several of these cases
15.

For a thorough analysis of the Tidelands Controversy prior to 1953, see

ERNEST R. BARTLEY, THE TIDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY: A LEGAL AND
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (Univ. of Tex. Press 1953).

16. Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Seaweed Rebellion: Florida'sExperience
with Offshore Energy Development, 18 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 1, 2 (2002).
17. Id.
18. Angelle, supra note 11, at 8.
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have directly impacted Louisiana and laid the groundwork for the
confrontation arising in Blanco v. Burton.
A. California I: The FederalGovernment Claims Dominion over
Offshore Lands
In October 1945, President Harry Truman issued a
proclamation that declared U.S. jurisdiction over "the natural
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf
beneath the high seas."' 9 Executive Order 9633 said the
proclamation did not affect the federal-state controversy as it
related "to the ownership or control of the subsoil and sea bed ' of
20
the continental shelf within or outside of the three-mile limit.
The Truman Proclamation defined the controversy strictly as a
domestic conflict between the federal and state governments, and
not as an issue of defining national boundaries for international
purposes.21
Federal or state ownership of the offshore area was particularly
relevant when it pertained to oil and gas leases granted to oil
companies. The owner of the sea bed in which the drilling took
place would be the recipient of the subsequent oil and gas
royalties. Between 1933 and 1937, the Department of the Interior
received a number of mineral lease applications from oil
companies seeking to drill offshore for oil and gas. 22 The
Department rejected all of these applications on the basis that
states owned the submerged lands.2 However, in 1937, Secretary
of the Interior Harold Ickes reversed this policy, announcing that
the federal government would begin granting oil leases covering
offshore lands.24
Since coastal states were also granting mineral lease
applications from oil companies seeking to drill offshore, the
Department of the Interior sought to assert its ownership of
offshore lands through a series of legal complaints filed against the
coastal states. Secretary Ickes persuaded President Truman to order
Attorney General Tom Clark to file a complaint against California
seeking a declaration that the United States owned the submerged
lands and mineral deposits off the California coast. Prior to this
19. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Oct. 2, 1945).
20. Exec. Order No. 9633, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305 (Sept. 28, 1945).
21. Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Tidelands Controversy Revisited, 19 ENVTL.
L. 209, 214 (1988).
22. Austin W. Lewis, A Capsule History and the Present Status of the
Tidelands Controversy, 3 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 620, 620 (1970).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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case, the U.S. Supreme Court issued more than thirty decisions,
consistently holding that coastal states owned submerged lands
under their navigable waters.25 However, in this landmark case of
1947, known as California I, the Court rejected as dicta its prior
decisions and created the legal concept of "paramount rights" in
deciding against California, emphasizing national defense concerns
and national supremacy as grounds for its ruling. 26 An important
aspect of these paramount rights was dominion over the energy
resources located therein. 2 ' The Court rejected California's
argument that the Equal Footing Clause2 8 granted the State the
same historical rights possessed by the original states over their
states never held
offshore lands. The Court held that the original 29
title to offshore lands beyond the low water mark.
In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter was in agreement with the
"paramount rights" analysis but said that mineral leasing by the
states was not an impediment to the federal government's claiming
the marginal sea as a part of the national domain. He believed that
claim was a political act that should be undertaken
by Congress
30
and not a judicial act for the Supreme Court.
B. Louisiana I: The State Loses its Claim to the Tidelands
With precedent set in California I, the federal government in
1948 filed complaints against Texas and Louisiana. The
complaints alleged that the United States was "the owner in fee
simple of, or possessed of paramount rights in, and full dominion
and power over, the lands, minerals and other things underlying the
Gulf of Mexico" off the Texas and Louisiana coasts out to the edge
of the continental shelf.3 1 The complaint
against Louisiana is
L32
commonly referred to as Louisiana
As one of its defenses in the case, Louisiana traced its title to
the submerged lands through various treaties, cases, and the Equal
Footing Clause contained in the national resolution admitting
25. See, e.g., The Abbey Dodge v. United States, 223 U.S. 166 (1912);
Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1 (1906); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139
U.S. 240 (1891); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
26. United States v. California (California1), 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
27. Id. at 29-41.
28. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.

29. 332 U.S. at 36.

30. Id. at 43-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

31.

BARTLEY,

supra note 15, at 196 (quoting United States v. Louisiana

(Louisiana1), 339 U.S. 699, 701 (1950)).

32. Louisiana1, 339 U.S. 699.
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Louisiana into the Union. 33 The Court rejected the equal footing
argument and stated that its holding in CaliforniaI applied.34 The
Court then awarded the title to the submerged lands with its
mineral resources to the federal government. 35 The Supreme Court
held that Louisiana had no title to the submerged lands beyond the
low water mark along the Gulf of Mexico or where the sea met the
inland waters.36 Unfortunately, Louisiana I did little to define the
coastal boundaries of Louisiana and left open the issue of who
controlled leases in the Outer Continental Shelf.37 As one
Louisiana attorney observed:
The Louisiana I case . . . created tremendous confusion
regarding the issuance of leases. Louisiana's administrative
body and the Department of the Interior were both issuing
leases on and around Louisiana's coast, because the
paramount rights decision had not delineated Louisiana's
coast, but stated that
38 the federal government now owned
everything off of it.
Louisiana continued to issue leases based upon the Coast
Guard Line,39 which included the barrier islands over which
Louisiana had exercised jurisdiction, vast tracts of marsh, and
submerged land that contained huge reserves of oil and gas.
Congress entered into a period of intense legislative activity on
the part of those wishing to return the submerged lands to the
status they had held prior to California I and Louisiana L
Beginning in January 1948, many such measures were introduced
during several Congressional sessions. 40 In each case, President
Truman vetoed the attempt to return the coastal property rights of

33. BARTLEY, supra note 15, at 200.
34. LouisianaI, 339 U.S. at 704-05.
35. Id. at 705-06.
36. Id. at 704-05.
37. Governor John McKeithen asked Paul M. Hebert, Dean of the Louisiana
State University Law Center, to assemble a team of attorneys to represent
Louisiana in litigation to establish the state's coastline. See Oliver P. Stockwell,
The Boundaries of the State of Louisiana,42 LA. L. REv. 1043 (1982).
38. Amos J. Cormier III, The Story of the Greatest Wealth Transfer in U.S.
History 15 (Feb. 27, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
39. The Coast Guard Line was established by an 1895 Act of Congress and
is generally located at the perimeter of the outmost barrier islands off of
Louisiana's coast. The issue is discussed in some detail in United States v.
Louisiana (LouisianaIV), 394 U.S. 1 (1969).
40. See, e.g., H.R. 4484, 82d Cong. (1951); S. 940, 82d Cong. (1951); H.R.
180, 81st Cong. (1950); H.R. 8137, 81st Cong. (1950); S. 155, 81st Cong.
(1949); S. 1545, 81st.Cong. (1949).
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41

ownership to the states. President Dwight Eisenhower's election
in 1952, coupled with the election of a Republican Congress,
resulted in the enactment of the Submerged Lands Act (SLA) of
1953.42 The SLA relinquished all federal claims to offshore lands
within the historic boundaries of coastal states.4 3 Under the SLA,
the Gulf States could assert a claim to submerged land within three
marine leagues of their coastlines. 4 Soon after the SLA became
law, Coni'ess enacted the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA)." 5 As stated in OCSLA, it is a policy of our nation that
the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) "is a vital national resource
reserve held by the Federal Government for the public, which
should be made available for ... orderly development, subject to
environmental safeguards, in a manner which is consistent with the
maintenance of competition and other national needs. 46
C. Louisiana I: The State Loses Billions in FutureRoyalties
In the 1950s, there was a rapid development of technology in
the oil and gas industries that allowed for offshore energy
development in ever deeper waters. As a result, it became essential
to establish specific federal-state boundaries. 47 In 1956, both
Louisiana and the federal government attempted to lease tracts in
the same area, located between three miles and three marine
leagues from shore. Defining boundaries would determine whether
federal or state governments would receive oil and gas royalties in
a given coastal area.
The suit against Louisiana, -joined by the other Gulf States,
became known as Louisiana1,.4"The Court established a two-part
test to determine if the Gulf States could claim submerged land
three marine leagues from their coastlines. 49 First, the state
boundaries had to have been defined as exceeding three miles from
their coastline on the day the state was admitted into the Union.
50
Second, Congress had to explicitly approve of those boundaries.
41.

BARTLEY, supra note 15, at 215.
42. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (2000).

43.
44.

§ 1311.
§§ 1302, 1312.

45. §§ 1331-1356.

46. § 1332(3). The outer continental shelf is essentially the area of the
continental shelf beyond the territory of the coastal states, which for Louisiana is
beyond three miles from the coast land. See §§ 1312-1313 (defining and
describing the seaward boundaries of the coastal states).
47. Fitzgerald, supra note 21, at 220.
48. United States v. Louisiana (LouisianaI), 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
49. Id. at 27, 33-36.
50. Id.
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The case established the boundaries of Texas and Florida at three
marine leagues (approximately 10.3 geographical miles) off of
their respective coastlines, while limiting the boundaries of
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama to only three geographical
miles. 51 Louisiana claimed that the Act of Congress admitting the
state to the Union in 1812 described the new state's boundaries as
including all islands within three leagues of the coast and should
be read to mean that Congress set the state's seaward boundary at
three leagues from its coast.5 2 The Court, however, agreed with the
federal government's argument that the Act was meant to include
only the islands themselves lying within three leagues of the coast
and not all waters within that distance as well. The result for
Louisiana was financially devastating, considering the vast oil and
gas reserves that were contained between the three mile mark and
the three league mark. Justice Black's dissent criticized the
majority for not establishing the coastlines from which the threemile or three-league boundary would be measured.54 Black's
dissent proved to be important because the Court would wrestle
with the standard for measurement in subsequent decisions.
D. Louisiana V: The State Loses its CoastlineBoundary Claim
The Supreme Court belatedly dealt with the issue raised in
Justice Black's Louisiana II dissent. In Louisiana 11155 and
Louisiana IV,56 the Supreme Court attempted to set the parameters
in defining the coastline of Texas. In Louisiana V, 7 Louisiana
claimed that the Coast Guard Inland Water Line established the
boundary of its inland waters, as prescribed by an 1895 statute.
Louisiana also claimed that a number of historic bays (in
particular, East Bay) were inland waters. 58 The Court decided that
the Coast Guard Inland Water Line was never intended to establish
a territorial boundary and denied Louisiana's claim. 59 Justice
Black's dissent in Louisiana V criticizes the majority for applying
standards for establishing California's coastal boundary to
Louisiana. 60 Black recognized Louisiana's unique geography that
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at65, 79, 82, 100-01.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id. at 85-101 (Black, J., dissenting).
United States v. Louisiana (LouisianaIl), 389 U.S. 155 (1967).
United States v. Louisiana (LouisianaIV), 394 U.S. 1 (1969).
United States v. Louisiana (Louisiana 1), 394 U.S. 11 (1969).
Id. at 74.
Id. at 27-35.
Id. at 79 (Black, J., dissenting).
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includes numerous coastal islands arranged in .a jagged, uneven
fashion. 61 Justice Black said:
Nor can I find any justification for applying the Convention
standard applied in the second California case to Louisiana,
a State that was not a party to the West Coast litigation but
urges us to adopt a different standard, one especially
convenient for application to Louisiana's own unusual
coast, and one never even considered in the West Coast
litigation. Under these circumstances I must dissent. I
would hold that "inland waters" should be measured in
Louisiana, and in any other State with similar coastal
characteristics, by the standard urged by Louisiana--the
Coast Guard line established years ago, under the authority
of an 1895 Act of Congress, to mark off the boundaries of
the States' "inland waters." Such a holding'would put an
end to a useless, unnecessary litigation, over an issue that
can well be characterized as de minimis so far as the
practical effect to the United States is concerned. 62
The end result of this decision was yet another loss of land and
revenue for Louisiana. The State's coast is jagged with numerous
islands, and the Court's holding put many submerged oil and gas
reserves beyond Louisiana's boundaries and control.
E. Louisiana'sStrugglefor CooperativeFederalism in the
Tidelands Oil Controversy
By 1970, Louisiana had suffered a string of defeats through
these Supreme Court holdings, resulting in negative financial and
environmental consequences for the state. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court's modus operandi in analyzing. who has control
over OCS activities was to determine if it was either the federal
government or the state governments. The Court never sought a
solution by basing its decisions on cooperative federalism that
distributes power between the federal and state governments. The
complexity of OCS activities, which involve both federal and
coastal state interests, require shared control by both the federal
government and the state governments.
Congressional enactment of environmental legislation in the
1970s and 1980s brought new challenges for federal and state
cooperation in offshore energy development. The energy needs of
the nation were growing while the environment of the coastal
61.
62.

Id. at 83-84.
Id. at 79-80.
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states was deteriorating. The tension between Louisiana and the
federal government reached a new zenith in 2005 when the
Department of the Interior announced it was proceeding with a
lease sale in the Gulf of Mexico only weeks after two destructive
hurricanes devastated Louisiana's coast. 63 Governor Blanco saw
the lease sale as an affront to Louisiana because it ignored
pertinent environmental regulations and dismissed environmental
concerns she had submitted. Louisiana's lawsuit against the
Department of the Interior in Blanco v. Burton can be seen as both
an apex and a turning point in this long-standing controversy
between Louisiana and the federal government.
III. BLANCO V. BURTON: LOUISIANA FILES SUIT AGAINST THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Less than three months after Katrina, and less than two months
after Rita, the U.S. Mineral Management Service (MMS)
published a notice of its intent to prepare an environmental impact
statement 64 for proposed Lease Sale 200 in the Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS). 65 What followed was a heated exchange between
Governor Blanco and the Department of the Interior that
eventually led both parties to federal district court.
A. The War of Words Leading to the Lawsuit
On May 30, 2006, Governor Blanco objected to MMS's use of
an outdated environmental assessment from 2002 and submitted
comments and recommendations to MMS. 66 The Governor said the
timing of the proposed lease sale was inappropriate and strongly
recommended postponing the lease sale until MMS could provide
a meaningful environmental assessment of OCS activities in light
of the damage to Louisiana's coast after the 2005 hurricane season.
See infra note 65.
64. NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact
statement (EIS) for lease sales. An EIS must address: (1) the environmental
impact of the proposed action, (2) environmental effects of the proposed action,
(3) alternatives to the proposed action, (4) the relationship between local shortterm uses of the environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm productivity, and (5) any irreversible commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000). See
also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (2008).
65. 70 Fed. Reg. 70,633 (Nov. 22, 2005).
66. The OCSLA requires the Secretary of the Interior to accept a
Governor's recommendations prior to a lease sale if those recommendations
provide for a reasonable balance between the nation's interests and the state's
interests. See 43 U.S.C. § 1345(c) (2000).
63.
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When MMS announced it was proceeding with the proposed lease
sale, the "oil and gas governor" drew the proverbial line in the
sand. 67 On June 14, 2006, Blanco made the following statement to
the press addressing her concerns:
The failure of the Federal Government to take action to
protect the precious coastal resources of Louisiana
continues to endanger the lives of our people, the future of
our economy and the stability of our nation's oil supply. I
cannot and will not stand by idly while we continue to lose
an entire football field of coastal wetlands every 38
minutes. The government's inaction has forced me today to
declare Lease Sale 200 . . . inconsistent
with Louisiana's
68
coastal zone management program.
On the same day, the State submitted comments to MMS,
criticizing the agency for failing to fully address the devastation of
Hurricanes Rita and Katrina in its assessments. 69 The Regional
Director of MMS responded to the State's comments, taking the
position that Lease Sale 200 is consistent with the policies of the
Louisiana Coastal Recovery Program but that MMS personnel
would be willing to meet with relevant state personnel to discuss
Louisiana's concerns. 70 Notably,
and sadly, the meeting between
71
the parties never took place.
In a letter dated July 11, 2006, MMS explicitly rejected
Louisiana's recommendation to postpone the lease sale, offering
the following reasons for its decision: (1) uncertainty in the MMS
lease sale process would cause companies to invest elsewhere, (2)
delay of the sale might have significant impact on the State of
Texas, (3) delay would impact the delivery of new natural gas
supplies, and (4) potentially hundreds of millions of dollars could
be lost by the U.S. Treasury as a result of a delay. 72 As such, MMS
determined Governor Blanco's recommendations did not provide a
reasonable balance between national and state interests, which
would be required to implement her recommendations.

67. Stephanie Grace, Editorial, An 'Oil and Gas Governor' Draws the Line,
TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 11, 2006, at B7.
68. Governor Blanco's Statement Regarding Her Letter to U.S. Mineral
Management Service, June 14, 2006, http://www.blancogovernor.com/index.
cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&articlelD= 1960.
69. Blanco v. Burton, No. Civ.A. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *5 (E.D.
La. Aug. 14, 2006).
70. Id.
71.

Id.

72. Id.
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B. FrustratedGovernor Sues the FederalGovernment
On July 20, 2006, Blanco and the State of Louisiana filed a
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana for declaratory and injunctive relief against MMS to
stop the lease sale. 73 One of the State's claims came under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),74 which requires the
preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) for major
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, such as a lease sale under the OCSLA. 75 The 1978
amendments to the OCSLA expressly determined that offshore
lease sales were major federal actions that require an EIS. 7 6 The
Governor alleged that MMS's decision to proceed with Lease Sale
200 was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to assess the
existing environmental baseline and failed to adequately analyze
the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the proposed lease
sale.7 7 The plaintiffs further alleged that MMS was relying on an
EIS from previous multi-sale leases that was outdated because it
did not account for the environmental impact of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita.78
Besides the coastal damage from the hurricanes, the outdated
assessment of MMS failed to consider the destruction to oil and
gas platforms and pipelines. In a release dated January 19, 2006,
MMS estimated that 3,050 of the Gulf of Mexico's 4,000 oil and
gas platforms, and 22,000 of the 33,000 miles of Gulf pipelines
were in the direct path of either Hurricanes Katrina or Rita. 7 9 In
May 2006, MMS estimated that 113 platforms were destroyed and
that 457 pipelines had been damaged. 80 However, while the
plaintiffs recognized that MMS recorded these statistics, the
agency failed to analyze these statistics and consider their potential
impact on future OCS activities.
Louisiana also claimed that MMS acted arbitrarily and
capriciously by failing to accept the Governor's recommendation
73. Id. at *1. The complete list of defendants in the complaint is Rejane
"Johnnie" Burton, Direct of MMS, Dirk Kempthome, Secretary of the Interior,
and American Petroleum Institute as intervenor.
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375 (2000).

75. § 4332(2)(C).
76. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1351 (2000).
77. Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046, at *7.

78. Id.
79. Press Release, U.S. Mineral Management Service, Impact Assessment
of Offshore Facilities from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Jan. 19, 2006),
http://www.mms.gov/ooc/press/2006/pressO 19.htm.

80. Id.
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that the lease sale be postponed. 8 1 The language of the OCSLA
states that such recommendations are to be given considerable
deference and must be accepted if they provide a reasonable
balance between national and state interests.' 2 The State requested
that the court enjoin the defendants from opening any bids or
awarding any leases connected with Lease Sale 200 until a83final
ruling was issued by the court on the merits of the complaint.
The American Petroleum Institute (API) represented the oil and
gas industry and intervened as a defendant, opposing the issuance
of a preliminary injunction. A memorandum filed by API
maintained the State had not demonstrated any imminent threat of
injury, an essential element for the granting of a preliminary
injunction.84 The API quoted the Fifth Circuit, a court recognizing
that a lease sale "does not involve a single undertaking or a project
which becomes a fait accompli the day the decision to proceed is
made." 85 Rather, a lease sale involves "separable operations over a
period of months and years, and restrictions in those leases give the
86
agency the ability to constantly control and adjust future action."
The API argued that even if the State could show that the cited
statutes were violated at this stage, the violations would not
threaten the State with imminent irreparable harm. 87 Additionally,
the API reminded the court that the first purpose given by
Congress in adopting the 1978 amendments to the OCSLA was to
establish policies and procedures for managing the oil and
natural gas resources of the Outer Continental Shelf which
are intended to result in expedited exploration and
development of the Outer Continental Shelf in order to
achieve national economic and energy policy goals, assure
national security, reduce dependence on foreign sources, 88and
maintain a favorable balance of payments in world trade.

81. Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046, at *7.
82. 43 U.S.C. § 1345(c) (2000).
83. Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046, at *6.
84. See Humana, Inc. v. Jacobson, 804 F.2d 1390, 1394 (5th Cir. 1986).
85. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 828 (5th Cir. 1975). See also
Memorandum of the Am. Petroleum Inst. in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for
a Preliminary Injunction at *5, Blanco v. Burton, No. Civ.A. 06-3813, 2006 WL
2366046 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2006) [hereinafter API Memorandum].
86. Sierra Club, 510 F.2d at 828. OCSLA segments the process of
developing oil and gas leases into four phases: preparation of a leasing plan,
leasing, exploration, and development and production. See § 1344(a)(3).
87. API Memorandum, supra note 85, at *5.
88. § 1802(1). See API Memorandum, supra note 85, at *13.
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The defendants argued that greater harm would come to the
nation by delaying the lease sale as compared with
89 little, if any
harm to Louisiana by proceeding with the lease sale.
In a reply memorandum, the State expressed its concern
regarding the defendants' assertion that the lease sale stage was not
very important and that any significant impacts could be addressed
at later stages of the leasing process.9 Through the OCSLA,
Congress had indicated that expeditious and orderly development
of the nation's oil and gas resources should be "subject to
environmental safeguards, and with due consideration to affected
States." 91 The plaintiffs reminded the court that in the 1978
amendments to the OCSLA, Congress explicitly made offshore
leases contingent upon environmental acceptability. 92 Louisiana
disagreed with the federal government's claim that irreparable
harm cannot occur at the lease sale stage because this reasoning
undermines the purpose of NEPA.93 NEPA requires that agencies
evaluate not only the direct effects of a proposed action but also
the cumulative and indirect effects that are reasonably
foreseeable. 94 Louisiana maintained that MMS did not comply
with NEPA before proceeding with the lease sale. 95 Louisiana
recounted a similar situation where a federal district court in
Massachusetts addressed the issue of MMS's failure to follow
federal regulations for lease sales. 96 The Massachusetts court
enjoined the Secretary of the Interior from conducting a lease sale
off the coast of New England in 1983. 97 That court determined that
"future access cannot effectively remedy violations of statutes and
regulations that impose duties upon the Secretary specifically with
respect to the decision to conduct [the] Lease Sale .... Correction
of those violations, if it is to have any meaning at all, must precede
the sale." 98 Louisiana saw the situation in Blanco v. Burton as
similar to the case considered in Massachusetts and petitioned the
89. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at *26-30, Blanco v. Burton, No. Civ.A. 06-3813, 2006
WL 2366046 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2006).
90. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at *2, Blanco v. Burton, No.
Civ.A. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046 (E.D. La. Aug. 8, 2006) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs' Reply].
91. H. REP. No. 95-1474, at 80 (1978) (Conf. Rep.).
92. See § 1338.
93. Plaintiffs' Reply, supra note 90, at *7-8.
94. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2008).
95. Plaintiffs' Reply, supra note 90, at *7.
96. Id. at *8-9.
97. Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1983).
98. Id. at 581.
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court to stop Lease Sale 200 until MMS complied with the
requirements of OCSLA and NEPA.
C. The Court'sDecision
Judge Kurt Engelhardt, the presiding judge, issued his order on
August 14, 2006, a mere forty-eight hours before Lease Sale 200
was scheduled to take place. His decision gave a warning to the
federal government that it had failed to comply with environmental
legislation requiring the Department of the Interior to act as a
partner to the coastal states in the OCS leasing process. 99 The
court's decision indicated a strong likelihood of success on the
merits in favor of the State.100 Judge Engelhardt noted that the
State's claims fell under three Acts of Congress: the NEPA, 101 the
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA),l°7 and the OCSLA.' 03
Regarding the NEPA claim, the court noted that in the
environmental assessment, MMS provided discussion of the
damage caused by the 2005 hurricanes to OCS facilities: the
overall impact of the hurricanes to the wetlands, the effects of the
hurricanes on water quality, the destruction caused to refineriesl °
and the impact on oil production caused by the storms.
However, "with little or no analysis as to why, MMS concludes
virtually every discussion of changes caused by the hurricanes with
a generalized statement that its prior conclusions as to the impacts
of OCS activities in connection with Lease Sale 200 remain
unchanged." 10 5 Judge Engelhardt agreed with the State's argument
that direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the proposed lease
activity are likely to be significantly different and that MMS's
Environmental Assessment provided no real analysis to support its
prior conclusions that the 2002 multi-sale Environmental
Assessment was still valid for Lease Sale 200.106
07 Thus, the
plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their NEPA claim. 1
Regarding the CZMA claim, the court recognized that this
legislation was passed to promote the development of coastal zone
management programs by the states and to encourage interaction
99. See Blanco v. Burton, No. Civ.A. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *7-14
(E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2006).
100. Id.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375 (2000).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1466 (2000).
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2000).
Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046, at *9.
Id.

106. Id. at*9-11.
107. Id. at *11.
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and cooperation between federal and state agencies involved in
programs affecting the coastal zone. 10 8 A federal agency carrying
out any activity affecting a state's coast must provide a
"consistency determination" (CD) to the relevant state agency to
determine if the federal agency's action is consistent with state
coastal programs.1°9 MMS's treatment of the Coastal Use
Guidelines from the Louisiana Coastal Restoration Program was
"so inadequate as to suggest that proceeding with Lease Sale 200
was a fait accompli even before the CD was compiled.""l 0 MMS
had failed to demonstrate, as it was required to do, that the direct,
indirect, and cumulative impacts of the agency's decision were
consistent with Louisiana's Coastal Use Guidelines.'11 The court
concluded that MMS's "cavalier approach" concerning these
critical issues was inadequate and indicated the plaintiffs
"substantial likelihood of success on the merits" with the CZMA
1
claim. '12
As for the OCSLA claim, Judge Engelhardt noted that "[t]he
Act imposes a specific duty to balance oil and gas production and
environmental health."' "13 The Act requires that the Secretary of the
Interior, in preparing a five-year leasing plan, select the timing and
location of leasing so as to obtain a proper balance between the
potential for environmental damage, the potential for the discovery
of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal
zone. 114 Under OCSLA, the Secretary is required to accept a
governor's recommendations regarding the proposed lease sale if
he determines that "they provide for a reasonable balance between
the national interest and the well-being of the citizens of the
affected State.""15 Judge Engelhardt concluded that Louisiana had
made a prima facie case that MMS had made an offhanded
dismissal of Governor Blanco's recommendations. MMS failed to
give serious consideration or a reasoned determination to accept or
108. See 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (2000).
109. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(C); 15 C.F.R. § 930.34(a)(1) (2008).
110. Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046, at *11.
111. Louisiana has initiated a series of programs to offset the catastrophic
loss of coastal wetlands. The Louisiana State and Local Coastal Resources
Management Act was passed in 1978 to regulate the developmental activities
that affect wetland loss. The resulting Louisiana Coastal Resources Program
became a federally approved coastal zone management program in 1980. This
program has delineated the state's Coastal Use Guidelines. See Dept. of
Natural Res., Coastal Restoration Division, http://dnr.louisiana.gov/crm/
coastres/coastres.asp (last visited June 30, 2008).
112. Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046, at *13.
113. Id.
114. Id.at* 13-14.
115. 43 U.S.C. § 1345(c) (2000).
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reject these recommendations and made
6 a forced effort to meet a
preexisting scheduled lease sale date."l
While the State was clearly favored in each of these claims, the
court denied Louisiana's request for a preliminary injunction to
stop the proposed lease sale."' The court found that the plaintiffs
had not made a sufficient showing of an immediate irreparable
harm by the opening of the lease sale. 118 Even if Louisiana had
shown some harm the harm would be very minimal before the
date of the trial.'" 9 Any injunctive relief provided by the court
following the trial on the merits would be as effective as
preliminary injunctive relief. 2 °
D. The PartiesNegotiate a Settlement Agreement
A pre-trial conference was set for November 3, 2006, and the
trial date was set for November 13, 2006.121 After encouragement
from Judge Engelhardt, a settlement agreement was reached
between the parties, and the case was dismissed on October 24,
2006.122 Under the agreement, MMS agreed not to conduct any
future lease sales in the Central or Western Gulf of Mexico without
issuing an updated EIS that would consider the cumulative impact
of past lease sales, including Lease Sale 200.123 The defendants
agreed that the CD submitted to Louisiana for the next OCS oil and
gas lease sale in the Gulf of Mexico will not simply replicate
another CD completed for a prior lease sale. 124 The defendants
further agreed that the environmental assessment would include a
detailed analysis of the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of
the proposed lease sale and its related activities, including
identifying onshore support services and infrastructure that the
applicant intends to utilize, as well as any onshore services that
have been affected by Hurricanes Katrina or Rita.' 25 Additionally,
the defendants agreed that any response to recommendations made
by the Governor of Louisiana regarding future lease sales would be

116. Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046, at *14.
117. Id. at *1.
118. Id. at 19.
119. Id. at*20.
120. Id.
121. Id. at*21.
122. 71 Fed. Reg. 66,343 (Nov. 14, 2006).
123. Settlement Agreement at 3, Blanco v. Burton, No. Civ.A. 06-3813, 2006
WL 2366046 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 2006).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 4.
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made directly by the Office of the Secretary of the Department of
the Interior. 126
In exchange for these commitments by the necessary federal
agencies, Louisiana agreed to dismiss the pending lawsuit. The
court, however, would retain jurisdiction to insure compliance with
the terms of the settlement agreement. 127 The dismissal order
provided that the case would be dismissed with prejudice if
Louisiana did not file a motion to enforce the agreement within
sixty days after the defendants notify the plaintiffs that they have
satisfied their obligations under the agreement.' 2 8 As a result of the
agreement, MMS also canceled Lease Sale 201, scheduled for
March 2007.129
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Recognizing the need for action to balance offshore energy
development with responsible environmental protections, both the
judicial and legislative branches of government can be part of the
solution. Federal courts are encouraged to use the preliminary
injunction before a lease sale takes place if it finds agencies are
ignoring environmental regulations. This will act as a strong
incentive for the Department of the Interior to honor environmental
legislation throughout the lease sale process. In addition, Congress
is encouraged to pass additional legislation that mandates a sharing
of oil and gas royalties with the coastal states to finance
desperately needed coastal restoration. Without revenue sharing,
the costs of coastal restoration will not be possible for the states.
A. Effective Use of PreliminaryInjunctions in Future Lease Sales
Judge Engelhardt should be commended for his assessment of
the environmental claims in Blanco v. Burton. He chastised the
U.S. government for failing to act as a partner with Louisiana in
the OCS leasing process and affirmed the state's contention that at
least three environmental acts of Congress had been ignored. 30 It
is crucial for federal courts to enforce the coastal states' demands
that the Department of the Interior honor local and national
environmental legislation in OCS activities.
126. Id. at 4-5.
127. Id. at 5.
128. Id. at 6-7.
129.

70 Fed. Reg. 66,344 (Nov. 14, 2006).

130. Blanco v. Burton, No. Civ.A. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *7 (E.D.
La. Aug. 14, 2006).
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The court erred, however, in its denial of Louisiana's request
for a preliminary injunction. The most important factor supporting
the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief is a finding that the
plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm before trial without such
31
relief. Plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating this harm.1
The U.S. government in Blanco attempted to demonstrate that a
lease sale presents no imminent environmental harm to coastal
states because there are further steps to be taken before oil
exploration begins. That fact, in the view of the Department of the
Interior, shows the lease sale alone cannot hurt the environment.
This argument, however, ignores the fact that the NEPA is not
designed to prevent all possible harm to the environment, but
rather is designed to influence the decision-making process. Its aim
is to force government agencies to take notice of environmental
considerations and to seriously consider them. When a decision
involving NEPA obligations is made without the informed
environmental consideration that the NEPA requires, the harm has
already occurred. 132 Some courts have concluded that when MMS
the NEPA, this merits an
ignores the intent of Congress through
133
injunction in the appropriate case.
While a NEPA violation should not automatically result in an
injunction, the analysis for determining irreparable harm should err
on the side of environmental protection. Government agencies
should not simply be able to point to additional steps between the
opening of a lease sale and environmental harm in order to stop a
preliminary injunction. Once MMS has made the initial
commitment to open a lease sale for drilling, it becomes
economically unwise and politically difficult to reverse that action.
It is better for federal courts to require MMS to follow the NEPA
and its requirement of an updated EIS before a lease sale will be
allowed to commence. Hopefully, federal courts will use this
effective method of enforcement of environmental regulations in
the future.
Judge Engelhardt's explicit encouragement of the parties to
arrive at a settlement agreement was an effective tool in fostering
131. Id at*15.
132. Alaska v. Andrus, 508 F.2d 465, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Jones v. Dist. of
Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 512-13 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
133. See California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1371 (C.D. Cal. 1981)
(stating that "leasing sets in motion the entire chain of events which culminates
in oil and gas development"); WILLIAM ROGERS, JR., ENvIRoNMENTAL LAW §
9.7 (1994) ("[NEPA's] purpose is to require consideration of environmental
factors before project momentum becomes irresistible, before options are closed,
and before agency commitments are set in concrete.").
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cooperative federalism through the settlement agreement process
itself. The fact that all of the parties reached an agreement without
going to trial is a sign that cooperative federalism is possible.
Besides judicial enforcement of environmental regulations,
Congress can be part of the solution by enacting further legislation
that results in a sharing of oil and gas royalties so that coastal
states can finance coastal restoration projects.
B. FederalLegislationMandatingShared Royalties with Coastal
States
Congress has passed legislation that fostered cooperative
federalism with respect to the OCS on more than one occasion.
The SLA and OCSLA in 1953 envisioned cooperative
development by the federal government and coastal states
regarding the large oil and gas deposits beneath the marginal sea.
At that time, the concerns for the environment we take for granted
today were not a priority of the federal and state legislatures.
"Conservation" simply meant that oil and gas production should
not waste any of the resources being sought. The motivation of
Congress in 1953 was based on the military's desire for a
petroleum reserve and not on preserving the fragile ecological
balance of the coastal area. 1 34 However, both the SLA and OCSLA
recognized the need for federal and state governments to work with
each other, not in spite of each other, as offshore energy
development progressed.
Fortunately when Congress passed the Gulf of Mexico Energy
Security Act' in 2006, they furthered the goal of cooperation
between federal and state governments. While Governor Blanco
confronted the Department of the Interior in court over
environmental regulations, United States Senator Mary Landrieu of
Louisiana challenged Congress over the issue of shared royalties
from oil and gas production in the Gulf of Mexico.
Senator Landrieu co-sponsored the bill with United States
Senator Pete Domenici of Arizona, but they were met with
opposition from some legislators and the White House.
Congressional leaders of coastal states with a moratorium on oil
and gas production off their coasts (such as California, Maine, and
Florida) were concerned that the proposed legislation would open
the door to ending that moratorium. Since the bill mandated a
sharing of royalties with the coastal states, the Bush
134. Alan V. Hager, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: The Prize and the
Responsibility, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T (SUMMER ISSUE) 44, 51 (1995).

135. Pub. L. No. 109-432, H.R. 6111, 109th Cong. (2006).
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Administration was concerned that the bill would channel too
much money from the Federal Treas6ury and escalate an already
skyrocketing federal budget deficit.13 However, those fears were
put to rest and Senator Landrieu was able to work out a series of
compromises among
diverse groups, eventually securing the
137 '
bill.
the
of
passage
The Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act allows offshore oil
and gas leasing in the 181 and 181 South areas of the Gulf of
Mexico (approximately 2.5 million acres) within one year of its
enactment. It also allows the expansion of oil and gas leasing into
the Eastern Planning, Central Planning, and Western Planning area
(an additional 5.8 million acres) at some future date, as soon as
practicable. 138 Revenue sharing is required on new areas of
production in the 181 Area from FY 2007 through 2016 as follows:
(1) 50% of the revenues from this project will be deposited into the
Federal Treasury; (2) 37.5% of the revenues will be deposited with
the Gulf producing states (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi and
Alabama); (3) 12.5% of the revenues will be deposited in the
Federal Land and Water Conservation Fund. 1 39 Revenue sharing
required on new leases after the date of enactment in existing
planning areas from FY 2016 through 2055 will be distributed
under the same percentages as listed above. 140
The Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority of Louisiana
(CPRA) 14 1 estimates that Louisiana's share of the revenues
generated by this Act will be approximately $20 million annually
between 2007 and 2016, for a total of $200 million during that ten-

136. See Letter from Samuel W. Bodman, U.S. Sec'y of Energy, to The
Honorable Joe Barton, Chairman of House, Senate Conference on H.R. 6 at 4
(July 15, 2005), available at http://www.taxpayer.net/energy/pdf/adminletterto
barton.pdf.
137. See, e.g., Sen. Landrieu Brings Fightfor Offshore Revenue Sharing to
FinancialLeaders, U.S. FED. NEWS, Nov. 27, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
20750725.
138. H.R. 6111 at § 3(a)-(b).
139. Id. at § 5(b)(1). The Federal Land and Water Conservation Fund
finances the acquisition of green spaces across the country as established in
1965 by 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4608.

140. Id. at § 5(b)(2).
141. Because of the devastation of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, in December

2005, the Louisiana Legislature restructured the State's Wetland Conservation

and Restoration Authority to form the Coastal Protection and Restoration
Authority (CPRA). Act 8 of the State's First Extraordinary Session of 2005
expanded the membership, duties, and responsibilities of the CPRA and charged
the new Authority to develop and implement a comprehensive coastal protection
plan, including both a master plan and annual plans.

2008]

NOTES

year period. 142 After 2016, the revenue share increases
dramatically because the oil producing states of the Gulf Coast
begin sharing in the lease revenues of a significantly larger area of
the Gulf of Mexico. The CPRA estimates that Louisiana's share
after 2016 will be approximately $600 million annually, for a total
of $12 billion during the 20-year period between 2017 and 2036.143
In a press release immediately following Senate passage of the
Bill, Senator Landrieu celebrated the landmark legislation:
Today the Senate confirmed its strong support for
Louisiana and the entire Gulf Coast by passing the
Domenici-Landrieu fair-share bill, which after nearly 60
years provides for Louisiana a significant share of oil and
gas revenues produced off our shores .... In August, 71
Senators agreed to the bill because they recognized that a
dedicated stream of revenue is necessary for Louisiana to
protect itself from future storms. Katrina and Rita showed
us what devastation
can ensue if our communities remain
44
vulnerable.1
In addition to the positive actions of Congress, Louisiana
fulfilled its obligation to use newly acquired royalty revenue for
environmental purposes. In 2006, the State passed a constitutional
amendment that specifically directs royalty funds for restoring
Louisiana's wetlands and for hurricane protection.1 45 The
amendment makes responsible use of royalty revenue and states:
"There shall be established in the state treasury the Coastal
Protection and Restoration Fund to provide a dedicated, recurring
of a
source of revenues for the development and implementation
14 6
program to protect and restore Louisiana's coastal area."'
Congressional passage of the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security
Act was significant because the legislative branch of government
chose to share royalties from offshore production when the judicial
branch had not required it to do so. Congress answered its call to
142. Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority of Louisiana, Federal
Funding Sources, http://lacpra.org/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid
=11 (last visited July 5, 2008).
143. Id. Revenue projections for fiscal years beyond 2016 remain somewhat
speculative. Variables such as the price of oil, the amount of oil and gas reserves
available, and subsequent congressional legislation must be taken into account,
making such projections uncertain.
144. Press Release, U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu, U.S. Senate Passes
Domenici-Landrieu "Fair Share" Plan in Early Morning 79-to-9 Vote (Dec. 9,
2006), available at http://landrieu.senate.gov/-landrieu/releases/06/2006C09513

.html.
145.
146.

LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.2(A) (amended 2006).
Id.

278

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 69

protect the environmental concerns of the coastal states while
ensuring future offshore energy development for the needs of the
nation. The Act has limitations in that significant sharing of
royalties does not occur for a number of years and only a small
area of the Gulf is affected. However, Congress has hopefully set
the stage for true cooperation in future offshore energy
development. Since a sharing of royalties is critical for continued
financing of coastal restoration, it is the hope of Louisiana that
Congress will pass additional legislation using this same model for
other areas of the Gulf of Mexico.
V. CONCLUSION

The devastation of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita exposed and
accelerated the crisis of coastal erosion in Louisiana. Damaged
wetlands and fewer barrier islands off Louisiana's coast enabled
the storms to maintain a greater ferocity as they progressed further
inland. This was a significant factor that caused approximately
1,464 deaths from Hurricane Katrina alone. 147 Environmental
issues literally became matters of life and death for the state. The
oil and gas industry, which had brought significant financial
benefit to Louisiana, was also one of the culprits contributing to
coastal erosion. When the Department of the Interior announced a
lease sale in the Gulf of Mexico only weeks after so many deaths
in Louisiana, the State perceived a federal agency that lacked
sensitivity to Louisiana's plight and ignored federal environmental
regulations. Blanco v. Burton highlights a confrontation between
Louisiana and the federal government that has taken place over
many decades. Fortunately for all parties concerned, the settlement
agreement between Louisiana and the federal defendants showed a
willingness of both sides to find a solution. This was a refreshing
change from the federalism feuds that took place throughout the
Tidelands Oil Controversy.
The energy and environmental needs of our nation are great,
requiring cooperation between all levels of government involved in
offshore energy development. While Blanco v. Burton
demonstrated the willingness of the court to enforce environmental
legislation, federal courts are encouraged to make greater use of
the preliminary injunction as a tool to enforce environmental
regulations. The enactment of the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security
Act was a positive legislative development because it demonstrated
147. La. Dept. of Health & Hospitals, Hurricane Katrina Deceased Reports as
of Aug. 2, 2006, www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/page.asp?ID=192&Detail=
5248 (last visited July 5, 2008).
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that the federal government would be willing to surrender some
control over offshore royalties for the sake of the energy needs of
our nation and the environmental needs of our coast. Congress is
encouraged to expand this legislation to other areas of the Gulf of
Mexico.
These positive results were precipitated by a devastating
hurricane. In that sense, a new hope for Louisiana's coastline has
emerged from the destructive horror that was Katrina.
PatrickB. Sanders*

* I am grateful to Professor Patrick H. Martin for his patient guidance and
to Amos J. Cormier III for inspiring me to pursue this important topic for
Louisiana. This Note is dedicated to my father, Robert L. Sanders, who
dedicated 35 years of his life to oil and gas production for our nation, while
always making environmental protection a priority in his work.

